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MEDICATING TO EXECUTE: SINGLETON V. NORRIS
MICHELLE L. BRUNSVOLD*

INTRODUCTION

In Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution forbids executing mentally ill persons.' The Ford majority
failed to articulate a standard by which competency may be measured, but Justice Powell wrote in his concurrence that, minimally, the
inmate should know he is to be executed and should know why he is
to be executed. 2 Since Ford,both lower courts and the Supreme Court
have struggled with mental health-related questions, such as: Can a
state medicate mentally ill inmates against their will? 3 Can a state
forcibly medicate mentally ill defendants for the sole purpose of rendering them competent to stand trial? 4
The question presented in this Comment is whether a state may
forcibly medicate prisoners in order to render them competent for
execution 5 without violating due process 6 or the Eighth Amendment.'
* J.D. candidate. Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2005:
A.B., English Literature, University of Chicago, 2002. 1am particularly grateful to Dean Harold
Krent and Professor Margaret Stewart for their comments and insight, and to Matthew
Bredesen, Tonya Newman, and Ryan Liebl for their careful editing. Each summer, the Law
Review invites students to participate in a closed-research writing competition, then selects new
members based on writing ability. The Chicago-Kent Law Review selected this Comment as the
Best Case Comment from the 2003 Summer Candidacy Competition.
1. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986). The Court did not choose a specific
rationale for its rule, but said whatever the reason given, "the restriction finds enforcement in
the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 410.
2. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). Since Ford, state courts and commentators have
developed a plethora of standards by which to adjudge an inmate's competency. See Keith Alan
Byers. Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Antipsvchotic Drugs, 47 ARK. L. REV. 361, 36366 (1994), for a description of the various standards used in different states.
3. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
4. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
127 (1992); United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002), vacated by 539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct.
2174 (2003).
5. This Comment focuses on inmates that have already been tried and convicted for their
crime. In order to have received the death penalty, the inmate must have been competent at the
time of trial; otherwise, proceedings would have been suspended until competency was
achieved. Byers, supra note 2, at 366-67 (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992);
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)). The question
arises: How should we treat those inmates who have degenerated into incompetency while on

1292

CHICAGO-KENT LA IV REVIEW

IVol 79:1291

The Eighth Circuit, in Singleton v. Norris, has held that due process is
satisfied if the medication is in the prisoner's best medical interest,
the state's interest in medicating the prisoner outweighs the prisoner's
interest in not taking the unwanted medication, and there is no less
intrusive method by which to accomplish the state's interest.' The
court further held that a state does not violate the Eighth Amendment when it executes a prisoner who became incompetent while on
death row, but who later regained competency through forciblyadministered medication, if the state was otherwise under an obligation to administer the medication.' The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, 0 and Singleton was executed in Arkansas on January
6, 2004.11
Part I of this Comment traces the development of the legal questions involving forcible medication. Part II of this Comment presents
the facts of Singleton, and details the basis for the majority and dissenting opinions. Part III argues, first, that in examining Singleton's
due process claim, the court incorrectly evaluated both the essentiality of the state's interest, as well as the medical appropriateness of the
medication. Further, regarding the court's Eighth Amendment analysis, Part III argues first, that the court incorrectly equates artificial
competency with true competency, and second, that because courts
death row? The development of mental illness while on death row is not an unusual phenomenon. For example, one commentator has written that as many as fifty percent of Florida's death
row inmates become insane or incompetent while waiting for their sentences to be carried out.
Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 35, 42 (1986). This statistic, however, must be read in perspective. Ernest van den Haag
points out that of the 20,000 homicides committed on average each year (as of 1986, the year of
Haag's piece), only 31)0 convicted murderers were sentenced to death. Ernest van den Haag,
The Ultimate Punishment:A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1662 (1986). Commentators cite
the uniquely stressful situation of an inmate on death row as the reason for his or her mental
degeneration; one has written that "possibly the most stressful of all human experiences is the
anticipation of death at a specific moment and time and in a known manner." Byers, supra note
2, at 367 (citing Ptolemy H. Taylor, Comment, Execution of the "Artificially Competent;" Cruel
and Unusual?, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (1992) (quoting Johnnie L. Gallemore & James H.
Panton, Inmate Responses to Length)' Death Row Confinement, 129 AM J. PSYCHIATRY 167, 167
(1972))).
6. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part, "[Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
7. The Eighth Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
S. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 11)26 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 74 (2003).
9. Id.
10. Singleton v. Norris, 124 S.Ct. 74 (2003).
11. See Steve Barnes, National Briefing South: Arkansas: One Execution Held, One is
Stayed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7. 21)04, at A-17.
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and medical professionals make mistakes in determining competency,
the fact that the death penalty is involved cannot be irrelevant.
I.

THE STATE OF THE LAW PRIOR TO SINGLETON V. NORRIS

Both English and American common law have long barred executing the insane.' 2 In Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held
that the Constitution also forbids the practice.1 3 Although the Court
was presented with an opportunity in 1990,' 4 it has never specifically
addressed whether a prisoner may be forcibly medicated for the purpose of rendering him competent to be executed. 15
A.

Forced Medication and Due Process in the IncarcerationContext

In Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court was asked whether
the involuntary medication regimen imposed on Harper, a convicted
inmate, violated his right to due process.' 6 At issue was Washington
State's Policy 600.30, which established substantive and procedural
standards for determining whether prison administrators could forcibly medicate an inmate."7 While in prison, psychiatrists had first diagnosed Harper as manic-depressive.8 They later found him to also be
suffering from schizo-affective disorder.9 Although Harper initially
gave voluntary consent to the administration of medication, he later
refused to continue taking the Haldol, Prolixin, and Mellaril, among
other antipsychotic drugs, which had been prescribed. 20 The treating
physician then sought to forcibly medicate Harper pursuant to Policy
600.30.1
Declining to apply strict scrutiny to Harper's due process claim
(or for any other claim challenging the constitutionality of a prison
regulation),2 2 the Court nonetheless recognized that even a convicted
12. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408-09 (1986).
13. Id. at 410.
14. Byers, supra note 2, at 386-S7 (noting that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in
Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990), but remanded the case to be considered in light of
its
recently issued opinion in Washington v. Harper).
15. Id. at 386.
16. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213 (1990).
17. Id. at 215.
18. Id. at 214.
19. Id. at 214 n.2.
20. Id. at 214 n.l.
21. Id. at 214.
22. Id. at 223.
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prisoner had a significant liberty interest in avoiding the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs. 3 The Court held that, because
under Policy 600.30 an inmate would only be treated with antipsychotic drugs against his will if he was "dangerous to himself or others
and the treatment [was] in [his] medical interest, '24 Harper's due
process rights were adequately protected.25 The Court reasoned that
the Policy balanced the inmate's protected liberty interest in not taking the medication against the state's interest in providing appropriate medical treatment in order to maintain a secure prison
26
environment.
B.

ForcedMedication, Due Process, and Trial Competency
1.

Maintaining Competence During Trial

Two years later, in Riggins v. Nevada, the Court had to decide
whether a defendant who was forcibly medicated to maintain his
competence for trial had, in fact, been denied a fair trial under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.2 1 In that case, the defendant,
while awaiting trial for murder charges, complained of hearing voices
in his head and having trouble sleeping. 28 The defendant was forcibly
administered Mellaril, an antipsychotic drug, and was subsequently
found legally sane and competent to stand trial. 29 Presumably once
the trial was underway, Riggins moved for an order suspending the
administration of the medication, on the theory that the medication
would affect his demeanor and mental state during the trial, and
would consequently deny him due process. 0 The court denied the
motion with a one-page order that gave no indication of its rationale,
and Riggins was later convicted and sentenced to death.3 1 On appeal,
the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Riggins's conviction and sentence, reasoning that the expert testimony presented at trial was sufficient to inform the jury of the effect of the medication, and holding

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 221-22.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 236.
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 132-33 (1992).
Id. at 129.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 131.
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that the denial of the motion to suspend medication did not violate
Riggins's trial rights.3 2
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which noted that
"[u]nder Harper, forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner
is impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness."33 The Court reasoned that
the Fourteenth Amendment affords a person detained for trial at
least as much protection as a convict, 34 and that the risk of trial prejudice can sometimes be justified by an essential state interest. 35 The
Court held, however, that on the particularly sparse facts of the record, there was no showing that the forced administration of antipsychotic medications was necessary to accomplish an essential state
policy. 36 The Court noted that Nevada "certainly" would have satisfied due process if it had been found, per Harper, that the treatment
was medically appropriate and essential for Riggins's own safety and
the safety of others. 37 The Court also noted that Nevada could have
satisfied due process if it had shown that there were no less intrusive
means by which it could obtain an adjudication of Riggins's guilt or
innocence.3 8
Although Nevada failed to show an essential state interest,
Riggins nonetheless expanded forcible medication doctrine. The "essential state policy" language adopted by the Court did two things:
first, it suggested that the appropriate standard of review for the constitutional claims of inmates involving forced medication is more than
the "reasonableness" standard called for by Harper39 ; and second, it
opened the door to other state interests, aside from a safe prison environment, that might justify forcible medication, such as the state's
interest in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Indeed,
the Court suggested that Nevada might have satisfied due process
requirements if it had shown that forced medication was necessary
either for ensuring the safety of Riggins or others, or for adjudicating
Riggins's guilt or innocence.0 In both cases, the State also had to
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
n.7 (8th
40.

Id. at 132.
Id. at 135.
Id.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id. at 135.
Id.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990); United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567
Cir. 2002), vacated b)y
539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174 (2003).
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
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show that it could not accomplish these objectives by less intrusive
measures."
2.

Establishing Competence to Stand Trial
a.

The Eighth Circuit's Sell Opinion

While Riggins focused on competence during trial, United States
v. Sell addressed whether a state may forcibly medicate a defendant in
order to render him competent to stand trial.42 In Sell, the Eighth Circuit held that the State could forcibly medicate a defendant for trial,
subject to certain limitations. 43 The defendant, Sell, was a dentist who
was indicted on several charges, the most serious being fraud and
attempted murder. 4 Because of Sell's deteriorating mental capacity,
the district court found him incompetent to stand trial and ordered
that Sell be hospitalized to determine whether there was a substantial
probability that he would regain the required competency.4 5 Two doctors evaluated Sell and determined that he should receive antipsychotic medication because his condition would deteriorate without it
and his behavior was dangerous, and further, that the medication was
likely to restore his competency for trial; however, one doctor did not
think Sell would respond well to the medication. 46 The magistrate
judge authorized the medication, finding that Sell posed a danger to
himself or others.4 7 Although the district court reversed the magistrate on the ground that there was insufficient evidence in the record
to support the forced medication, nonetheless the court held that the
State's interest in trying Sell was sufficient to warrant the forced
medication.4 1 Sell then appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
In deciding the case, the Eighth Circuit followed Riggins and
held that in order for the state to forcibly medicate a defendant for
trial, the state must demonstrate: (1) that there is an essential state
interest that outweighs the individual's interest in remaining free
from medication, (2) that there is no less intrusive way to fulfill the

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Sell, 282 F.3d at 562.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 563.
Id.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 565.
Id.
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state interest, and (3) that, by clear and convincing evidence, the
medication is medically appropriate. 49 The court further explained
that medication is medically appropriate if: "(1) it is likely to render
the patient competent; (2) the likelihood and gravity of side effects do
not overwhelm its benefits; and (3) it is in the best medical interests of
the patient." 0
Affirming that the State had met its due process burden, the
Eighth Circuit reasoned that the charges against Sell-sixty-two
counts of fraud and one charge of money-laundering-were serious
charges, which the State had an essential interest in adjudicating.5'
Further, the court readily determined that there were no less intrusive
measures by which to fulfill that interest.52 Finally, the Eighth Circuit
agreed with the district court that the medication was medically appropriate because the State produced clear and convincing evidence
that the medication could be expected to lessen Sell's delusions and
thereby render him competent to stand trial5 3 that the side effects
could be minimized,"4 and that the medication was in Sell's interest
because reducing the delusions would improve his quality of life. 55
b.

The Supreme Court's Sell Opinion

The Supreme Court granted certiorarifor Sell's case. 56 Although
it vacated the Eighth Circuit's opinion, the Court largely agreed with
the test employed in the case. The Court did break down the due
process test differently (holding that in order to permit involuntary
medication for trial competence purposes, a court must conclude (1)
that important governmental interests are at stake, (2) that involuntary medication must significantly further the state interest, (3) that
involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests, and (4)
that administration of the drugs is medically appropriate), 57 but the
Supreme Court's analysis largely mirrors that of the Eighth Circuit's.
49. Id. at 567 (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992)).
50. Id. (citing United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873. 876 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990)).
51. Id. at 568.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 570.
54. Id.
55. Id.at 571.
56. It should be kept in mind that the Supreme Court's Sell opinion was released after the
Eighth Circuit's opinion in Singleton v. Norris. and so the Eighth Circuit did not have the benefit of Sell.
57. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 2184-85 (2003).
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The Court disagreed with the outcome of the case, however, holding
that, as Sell had been found by the district court to not be a danger to
himself or others, the Eighth Circuit was wrong to approve forced
medication solely to render Sell competent to stand trial. 58 The Court
reasoned that, though the State's interest in trying Sell was important,
that interest had been lessened by Sell's already lengthy confinement
in a mental hospital. 5 The Supreme Court explicitly criticized the
lower courts for failing to consider this prior confinement. 0 The
Court did, however, encourage the State to refile and pursue its request for medication based on Harper-type grounds, that is, that Sell
was dangerous to himself or to others.61
C.

Forced Medication and Competency for Execution

Although in Singleton, the Eighth Circuit was the first federal
appeals court to squarely reach the medicating-to-execute issue, two
state supreme courts had previously considered the question.62 Both
of these courts held that the state could not medicate an inmate solely
for the purposes of execution, but both based this on state constitutional right to privacy provisions. 3 In State v. Perry, however, the
court did evaluate Perry's case in light of Harper, but found that
Harper did not control, because the State failed to meet a Harper
showing of dangerousness to self or others, and that the medication
was in the interest of the inmate.6 4 The court in this case reasoned that
a state would never be able to meet the Harperrequirements because
"forcible administration of drugs to implement execution is not medi6' 5
cally appropriate.

58. Id. at t23 S. Ct.2187.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993); State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. t992).
Singleton, 437 S.E.2d at 61; Perry, 610 So. 2d at 755.
Perry, 610 So. 2d at 751-55.
Id. at 754.
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II. SINGLETON V. NORRIS
A.

Facts

Charles Laverne Singleton murdered Mary Lou York on June 1,
1979.6 York died from the loss of blood from two stab wounds Singleton inflicted in her neck. 67 Singleton was convicted of capital felony
murder, 68 and his execution was scheduled for June 4, 1982.69 Years of
petitions and appeals followed.7 0 During his 1993 federal Ford habeas
petition, Singleton conceded on appeal to the Eighth Circuit that he
was competent for execution while he was on antipsychotic medication, which he was taking voluntarily at the time." Although the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Singleton's 1993 federal habeas petition, it left the door open for a future Ford claim based on
changed circumstances.72 In 1997, presumably after a period in which
Singleton was not medicated, a review panel unanimously agreed that
Singleton posed a danger to himself and others, and the State placed
Singleton on an involuntarily medication regimen.7 3
The medication took effect; Singleton regained legal competency, and the State scheduled Singleton's execution for March 1,
2000.14 Singleton then filed another habeas corpus petition, arguing
that the State could not forcibly medicate him solely for the purpose
of rendering him competent to be executed without violating his due
process and Eighth Amendment rights. 75 The district court dismissed
the appeal, finding no evidence in the record that the State was in any
degree motivated to administer the drugs solely to render Singleton
competent to be executed.7 6 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit initially
reversed the district court, 77 but then reheard the case en banc,
66. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1020 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Singleton v.
State, 623 S.W.2d 180, 181 (Ark. 1981)), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 74 (2003).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1021.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 1021-22 for a detailed description of Singleton's many state and federal appeals.
71. Id. at 1021.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1021-22.
77. Id. at 1020 (citing Singleton v. Norris, 267 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2001)).
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vacated the panel decision, and affirmed the district court. 78 It is this
final en banc opinion of the Eighth Circuit that is the focus of this
Comment.
B.

The Eighth Circuit'sMajority Opinion

The appeal presented two issues: (1) whether, without violating
due process, a state may forcibly administer antipsychotic medication
to a prisoner whose date of execution has been set, and (2) whether,
without violating the Eighth Amendment, a state may execute a prisoner who is artificially competent because of a forced medication
79
regimen.
In affirming the district court on the due process issue, the
Eighth Circuit held that "the mandatory medication regime, valid
under the pendency of a stay of execution, does not become unconstitutional under Harper when an execution date is set."" ° The court
adopted and employed the same rule that it had used in United States
v. Sell: In order to justify the forcible medication of an inmate when
that medication would render the prisoner competent for execution,
the state must (1) present an essential state interest that outweighs
the individual's interest in remaining free from medication, (2) prove
that there is no less intrusive way to fulfill the essential interest, and
(3) prove by clear and convincing evidence that the medication is
medically appropriate.8 ' Medication is medically appropriate where it
is in the best medical interest of the inmate, where the medication is
likely to render the inmate competent, and where the severity of the
side effects of the medication does not overwhelm its benefits."

78. Id. The Eighth Circuit granted a stay of execution while it heard Singleton's appeal. Id.
at 1022. The court ordered a limited remand, asking the district court first, whether Singleton
was competent prior to the involuntary medication regime started in 1997, and second, whether
Singleton would regress into incompetency if the State stopped administering the medication.
Id. The district court found that Singleton was not Ford-competent at the time the medication
regime began in 1997. Id. The district court could not say with certainty whether Singleton
would regress to the point of becoming Ford-incompetent if he were taken off the medication.
but did find that Singleton's psychosis would resurface without medication. Id. A divided panel
reversed the district court, and the State petitioned for a rehearing en banc. Id. at 1020. On
rehearing, the Eighth Circuit granted the petition, vacated the panel opinion, and affirmed the
district court. Id.
79. Id. at 1023.
80. Id. at 1026.
81. Id. at 1024 (citing United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2002), vacated by 539
U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003)).
82. Id. (citing Sell, 282 F.3d at 567).
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As indicated in the discussion of Harper and Riggins above, the
standard of review for the constitutional claims of inmates involving
forcible medication regimes is somewhat unclear. The Eighth Circuit
thought that Harper and Riggins called for "some sort of heightened
standard of review. ' 83 In Harper, the Court declined to adopt a standard of strict scrutiny for claims by inmates that prison regulations
were unconstitutional, and instead established a standard of reasonableness.14 The Court again declined to apply strict scrutiny in
Riggins, but some Courts of Appeals have nonetheless interpreted
Riggins as applying a standard more stringent than the reasonableness called for in Harper.85 The Eighth Circuit is in this group, and
applied a standard in Singleton that was more than reasonableness
but less than strict scrutiny.16
To reach its holding that the State had met the burden required
to force medication on Singleton, the court treated each part of the
due process analysis in turn. First, although the court had determined,
and Singleton had agreed, that the medication regime would have
been valid under Harper if no execution date had been set (because
Singleton had been found to be a danger to himself or to others),87 the
court did not justify the medication on this ground. Instead, the court
justified Singleton's forcible medication on the State's interest in carrying out Singleton's lawfully imposed sentence. The court held that
the interest in carrying out Singleton's capital punishment sentence
outweighed Singleton's substantial liberty interest in remaining free
of unwanted medication. 88 The court felt that the State's interest in
carrying out the lawfully imposed sentence "could not be doubted"8 9
and was the greatest in capital murder cases where the death penalty
had been imposed. 90
The court readily concluded that the second part of the test, requiring that there were no less intrusive measures by which the State
could ensure Singleton's competence, had been met."' The crux of

83. Sell, 282 F.3d at 567 n.7.
84. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990).
85. Sell, 282 F.3d at 567 n.7.
86.

Id.

87. Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026 (relying on the fact that the Harper procedure had been
followed and met to find that the medication was in Singleton's best interest).
88.
89.

Id. at 1025.
Id.

90.
91.

Id.
Id.
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Singleton's argument, however, rested on the third part of the testthat medication could not be in his best medical interest when it
would ultimately render him eligible for execution."2 The court rejected this argument, however, and held that, "[tihe due process interests in life and liberty that Singleton asserts have been foreclosed
by the lawfully imposed sentence of execution and the Harper procedure." 93 The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would lead to impracticable choices for the court: involuntary medication followed by
execution on one hand or no medication followed by psychosis and
imprisonment on the other. 4 Although Singleton offered a third option-a stay of execution until involuntary medication was no longer
needed to maintain competence-the court rejected it out of hand.
The court reasoned, "[fun the circumstances presented in this case, the
best medical interests of the prisoner must be determined without
regard to whether there is a pending date of execution." 95
In affirming on the Eighth Amendment issue, the court held that
the state does not violate an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights when
it executes a prisoner who lost competency while on death row but
regained that competency due to appropriate medical care. 96 So long
as the state is under an obligation to administer medication in the best
medical interest of the prisoner, any additional motive to administer
the medication is irrelevant. 97
C. Judge Heaney's Dissent
Dissenting Judge Heaney believed the crux of the case was the
fact that Singleton, while lucid at times because of forcible medication, was nonetheless not cured. "Underneath this mask of stability,"
he wrote, "[Singleton] remains insane." 98 Judge Heaney thought that
Singleton's execution would violate both his Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his right to due
process. Regarding the Eighth Amendment, Judge Heaney decried
"the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance," arguing that Singleton was "severely deranged without treatment" and that to execute
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1027.
Id.
Id. at 1034 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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such a person was cruel and unusual punishment."99 He also questioned whether Singleton was in fact competent even while on the
forced medication. 0 If the medication failed to render Singleton
competent, Singleton's execution would most certainly violate Ford."'
Regarding the due process issue, Judge Heaney criticized the majority for pinning the constitutional question on an inquiry into the
state's motivation for forcibly medicating an inmate.02 He pointed out
that courts would have a difficult time ascertaining the state's motivation, and expressed doubt that the courts could even find an exclusive
motive. 031 Judge Heaney further argued that, "[a]t the very least, the
setting of an execution date calls into question the State's true motivation for administering the medication in the first instance."' 04 For
Judge Heaney, the justification for forcibly medicating Singleton was
pretextual and evaporated the moment the execution date was set. 05
Finally, Judge Heaney argued that the majority's holding created
an insurmountable dilemma for the medical profession by requiring
that the community practice in a manner contrary to its Hippocratic
Oath to "do no harm.' 10 6 He noted that courts have long taken the
integrity of the medical profession into consideration in the decision
making process, but he felt that the majority had eschewed it altogether in Singleton's case. 107

III. ANALYSIS
A.

The Court Misapplied the Due Process Test

In Singleton, the Eighth Circuit held that in order to satisfy due
process when a prisoner subject to the death penalty is forcibly medicated, the state must "(1) present an essential state interest that outweighs the individual's interest in remaining free from medication, (2)
prove that there is no less intrusive way of fulfilling [the state's] essen99. Id. at 1030 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986)).
100. Id. at 1031-35.
101. Id. at 1032-34.
102. Id. at 1036.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1036-37.
107. Id. at 1037 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (recognizing the
significance of the medical profession's position against physician-assisted suicide)).
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tial interest, and (3) prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
medication is medically appropriate."' 08 Medication is medically appropriate where it is in the inmate's best medical interest, where it is
likely to render the inmate competent, and where the severity of its
side effects does not overwhelm its benefits.10 9
1.

The State's Interest in Capital Punishment

In order to satisfy the first element of the due process test, the
state must show that it has an essential interest that outweighs the
inmate's interest in being free from unwanted medication. The Eighth
Circuit thought that the state's interest in carrying out a lawful sentence "could not be doubted," and that this interest was greatest in a
capital punishment case."10 Indeed, the Singleton majority states: "Society's interest in punishing offenders is at its greatest in the narrow
class of capital murder cases in which aggravating factors justify imposition of the death penalty.""'
Harperand Riggins support the proposition that the state's interest in carrying out lawfully imposed, severe punishments is an essential one. But because the court disregarded the possibility that
Singleton could have served a life term in the event that he did not
achieve unmedicated competency, the court improperly determined
that the state's interest in carrying out Singleton's death penalty was
an "essential state interest."
a.

Carrying Out Lawfully Imposed Punishments

The Supreme Court in Harper and Riggins did not catalogue
which state interests were or were not essential. The Harper Court
did not even speak in terms of an "essential state interest," instead
focusing narrowly on the dangerousness of an inmate. Riggins is similarly inconclusive on what exactly is an essential state interest because
the facts in that case were not sufficient to warrant a finding of an
essential state interest. These cases may be used, however, to glean
the parameters of an essential state interest in order to evaluate the
correctness of the Eighth Circuit's finding in Singleton.

108. ld. at 1024 (quoting United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2002), vacated by
539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003)).
109. Id. (citing Sell, 282 F.3d at 567).
110. Id. at 1025.
111. Id.
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If Harper were decided today, there is little doubt that maintaining the safety of the prison environment would be found to be an essential state interest. Other inmates, workers in the prison, and the
inmate himself may be endangered by an unmedicated mentally ill
inmate's behavior.112The Riggins Court, which did employ the language of an essential state interest, indicated that the safety of the
prison environment was an essential state interest when it said in dictum that Nevada could have satisfied due process if it had shown that
Riggins was a danger to himself or others.
As mentioned above, Riggins is somewhat unhelpful in pinning
down the definition of an essential state interest in a forced medication case. The facts did not support a finding of an essential State interest on Nevada's part, and the Court only indicated how due
process might have been met, from which one must assume that the
examples involved represented essential state interests. The Court
noted that Nevada "certainly" would have satisfied due process if it
had been found, per Harper, that the treatment was medically appropriate and essential for Riggins's own safety and the safety of others."' The Court also noted that Nevada could have satisfied due
process if it had shown that it could not obtain an adjudication of
Riggins's guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means. 1 4 After
Riggins, it seems likely that both the safety of the prison environment
and the ability to adjudicate guilt or innocence are essential state interests.
The court in Singleton correctly determined that carrying out a
lawfully imposed, severe punishment is an essential state interest.
Although the court offered little reasoning for its decision, saying
only that the essentiality of the interest "cannot be doubted," Riggins
supports the proposition that enforcing severe punishments is an essential state interest. The Riggins Court indicated that adjudicating
guilt or innocence is an essential state interest; it follows that, so too
must be punishing a guilty actor for his crime. It would make no sense
to consider the assessment of blame essential, yet deem the atonement for the crime non-essential.

112. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990).
113. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
114. Id.
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Weighing the State's Interest According to the Severity of the
Sentence

In addition to finding that the punishment of serious crimes is an
essential state interest, the Eighth Circuit also indicated that the
state's interest in carrying out a sentence for a serious crime, such as
one where the death penalty is imposed, is greater than the state's
interest in carrying out a sentence for a less serious crime. 1 5 Indeed,
the court noted that the state's interest in carrying out lawfully imposed sentences is the greatest in a capital punishment case. 1 6 Certainly this is true; greater harms must be met by greater and more
certain punishments. Whether the motivation is deterrence or retribution, the state's interest in accomplishing either goal is the greatest
when capital punishment has been imposed.
c.

The State's Option of Life Imprisonment

The Singleton court correctly found that punishing serious crimes
is an essential state interest; it was also correct to weigh the state's
interest according to the severity of the crime. Where the court
reached the wrong result, however, was in its finding that exacting
capital punishment, when there was the alternative of life without
parole, was an essential state interest.
Although the state's interest in exacting punishment is essential,
that interest may also be met by a term of life imprisonment; therefore, the state's interest in exacting a capital punishment sentence is
not, in itself, essential. The state has an interest in punishing those
convicted of crimes, especially those convicted of serious crimes, but
does not have an essential interest in the particular means chosen to
effect such punishment. As long as there is a viable alternative means
by which the state may satisfy its interest in punishment, such as imposing a life sentence on an inmate who is mentally incompetent in
the absence of forcibly-administered medication, the state does not
have an essential interest in carrying out a death sentence. In fact, the
alternative of a term of life imprisonment, in the event that the inmate does not achieve the competency required for execution, may
actually lessen the state's interest in a capital punishment case.
Sell supports the position that alternative punishments lessen the
state's interest carrying out a death penalty sentence. When evaluat115. Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1025.
116. Id.
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ing the essentiality of the State's interest in Sell, the Supreme Court
thought that the State's interest in trying Sell was lessened, although
not eliminated, by the fact that Sell had already spent a significant
amount of time confined in a mental health institution before trial." 7
The Sell Court noted that the value of Sell's prior confinement, in
essence, should have been subtracted from the essentiality of the
State's interest. Similar reasoning should have applied in Singleton's
case. The alternative punishment of life imprisonment should have
been subtracted from the State's interest in executing Singleton. The
State's interest in executing Singleton should have been lessened,
although not eliminated, by the fact that Singleton could have served
a life sentence in the event that he did not regain the unmedicated
competency necessary to receive the death penalty.
2.

Failure to Look Beyond Singleton's Narrow Medical Interests

Part three of the Eighth Circuit's due process test involves assessing whether the forced administration of medication is medically appropriate. According to the Eighth Circuit, medication is medically
appropriate where it is in the best medical interest of the inmate,
where the medication is likely to render the inmate competent, and
where the severity of the side effects of the medication does not
overwhelm its benefits."' The problem with the court's application of
this test to Singleton arises with the first element. The court held that
the "the mandatory medication regime, valid under the pendency of a
stay of execution, does not become unconstitutional under Harper
when an execution date is set."" 9 The court reached this conclusion
by disregarding Singleton's central argument: that medication "obviously is not in the prisoner's ultimate best medical interest" where the
consequence of the medication is that the patient is executed.1 20 The
court found the short-term, narrow effect of the medication to be the
only effect of any relevance.121 This was because to hold otherwise
would result in two impractical choices: either involuntary medication
followed by execution, or no medication followed by life imprisonment.1 22 The court did not consider Singleton's suggestion, to grant a
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
t22.

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 2187 (2003).
Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1024.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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stay of execution until he regained unmedicated competency, a viable
option 123
The court should not have only looked to the narrow, short-term
effects of the medication. Medication necessarily negatively affects an
inmate's medical interests when the ultimate effect is death. When
forced medication is not in the best medical interests of the inmate, it
is a violation of due process. In Harper,Riggins, and Sell, the medication was in each inmate's short-term interest, and either was in-or
did not negatively affect-the inmate's long-term interest. In the case
of an already incarcerated inmate, as in Harper,any increase in sanity
and mental health, so long as the side effects do not outweigh the
benefits, is clearly in the inmate's short- and long-term medical interest.
Where the circumstances of the case involve adjudicating guilt or
innocence, as in Riggins and Sell, medication is also in the defendant's
long-term interest because the defendant has a long-term interest in
obtaining a determination of guilt or innocence. If the defendant is
found not guilty, the defendant has a long-term interest in not being
stigmatized by the attachment of guilt. If the defendant is found
guilty, the effect of the medication may lead to incarceration. While
this is arguably not in the defendant's long-term health interest for
many reasons, the medication does not determinatively negatively
affect the defendant's long-term health interests because even though
the defendant may be in jail, at least he or she will be receiving appropriate medical care. Appropriate medication improves the defendant's overall sanity and quality of life. In Singleton's case, the
medication absolutely negatively affected his long-term health interests because it enabled the state to execute him.
The Eighth Circuit's assessment of the medical appropriateness
of forced medication is not disturbed by, and may be in line with, the
Supreme Court Sell opinion. Similar to the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court urges looking first for other Harper-type grounds to
justify the forced medication, and in the event that the "medication [is
authorized] on these alternative grounds, the need to consider authorization on trial competence grounds will likely disappear. ' 124 This
language suggests that the Supreme Court might agree that if the
state is obligated to medicate the inmate because other Harper-type

123. Id.
124. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2185-86 (2003).
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grounds are met, the broader consequences of the medication-in
Singleton's case, death-would be irrelevant. If so, this conclusion
would be wrongheaded for the reasons argued above.
The Supreme Court further explained that if there are not alternative grounds for forcibly medicating a prisoner, then the Harper
inquiry will inform its decision as to whether forced medication is
justified by a state interest.125 Although it is clear that the state has an
essential interest in the competency of a criminal defendant at trial,
the Court's tone suggests that absent other Harper-type grounds, it
might not be convinced of that alternative state interest. If this is so,
in the capital punishment context, the result would be unacceptable.
An insane inmate's fate would depend on whether he or she happened to be dangerous or not. The mental health of a dangerous inmate and a non-dangerous inmate might be equivalent, yet one is
eligible for execution (the dangerous person, because of the Harper
grounds for forcibly medicating him into competency) and one may
not be (the non-dangerous person, because Harperis unsatisfied and
he cannot be forcibly medicated into competency).
The Eighth Circuit was wrong when it considered the fact of a
scheduled execution irrelevant in evaluating the appropriateness of
medication. Finding Harper-type grounds and ignoring other consequences may be defensible in other contexts, but in a capital punishment case, an obligation to medicate because of a Harper finding
cannot be dispositive.
B.

The Eighth Amendment

Singleton's second argument on appeal involved the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Singleton
claimed that the Eighth Amendment forbids executing the artificially
competent. 26 The court held that because the state was under an obligation to administer the medication, any other effect was irrelevant.127
Once again the court wrongly ignored the essential elements of the
case. At the end of the day, the state executed a person who was mentally ill.128 Artificial sanity is not the same as true sanity. 29 As dissenting Judge Heaney argued, "treatment is not synonymous with being
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 123 S. Ct. 2186.
Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026.
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1033-34 (Heaney, J.,
dissenting).
Id.
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cured"; antipsychotic drugs merely mask mental illness. 130 Competency in Singleton's case was a fiction maintained only by powerful
antipsychotic medication. Judge Heaney considered Singleton's competency fabricated and wrote: "I would hold that the State may continue to medicate [him], voluntarily or involuntarily, if it is necessary
to protect him or others and is in his best medical interest, but it may
not execute him." 131 When stripped to the bare bones, fulfilling
Singleton's death penalty sentence went against Ford's prohibition on
32
executing the insane.
The court's holding is also problematic because, by disregarding
that a now-competent inmate is eligible for execution when the state
is otherwise obligated to medicate the inmate, the state will likely be
executing those furthest from competency instead of those closest to
it, if one must fashion such a continuum. This is because the test the
Eighth Circuit has formulated to determine if medication is medically
appropriate leads to the paradoxical result that the state's most ill
inmates will now be the most eligible for medication and then execution. According to the Eighth Circuit, medication is medically appropriate where it is in the inmate's best medical interest, where the
medication is likely to render the inmate competent, and where the
severity of the side effects of the medication does not overwhelm its
benefits.1 33 The court's test is fine until it is applied in the capital punishment context. Outside of that context, we want the most mentally
ill persons to be the most eligible for treatment. But once the death
penalty enters the picture, the result becomes that we are potentially
medicating and executing insane inmates.
This paradoxical outcome is problematic under Ford because
courts and medical professionals make mistakes. Who knows what
sanity really is-indeed a plethora of legal standards exist in the several states. 34 Justice Powell's standard that an inmate must know that
he is to be executed and why 35 is arguably not hard to meet; our society executes inmates who many of us might consider insane despite
the legal answer. 136 Given this, the result that the most ill inmates are
130. Id. (collecting cases and commentary).
131. Id. at 1037.
132. Id. at 1030.
133. Id. at 1024.
134. Byers, supra note 2, at 363-66 (listing standards).
135. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
136. Robert Sherrill, Electrocution Binge: In Florida, Insanity Is No Defense, 239 NATION
537, 552-55 (1984).
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those most eligible for medication and execution is worrisome. The
irreversible death penalty is involved; humans, courts, and medical
professionals make mistakes. As such, the fact that the inmate is eligible for execution cannot be "irrelevant" in an Eighth Amendment
analysis. Because artificial competency is not the same as true
competency, and because Singleton's medically appropriate test funnels the most ill inmates, and those most subject to the potential for
institutional mistakes, toward the execution chamber, the only acceptable course under the Eighth Amendment is to stay an artificially
competent inmate's execution until the inmate achieves unmedicated
competency.
CONCLUSION

Regarding due process, the Eighth Circuit was correct to say that
carrying out the lawfully imposed sentences for severe crimes is essential; it was also correct to weigh the state's interest according to
the severity of the crime. Where the court first faltered was in its assessment of the capital punishment context. Here, the court found
that the state's interest is essential and the greatest in the capital punishment context. By dismissing the argument that Singleton could
simply serve a life sentence until regaining unmedicated competency,
the court asserted that the narrow difference between carrying out a
death penalty sentence over a sentence of life imprisonment warranted a finding of essentiality. The state's interest, however, is no
greater and is actually less than a life imprisonment case. The court
also faltered when it disregarded the broad implications of forced
medication in a capital punishment case. Medication can never be in a
person's long-term medical interest when the ultimate result is death.
The court also failed in its Eighth Amendment analysis. The court's
outcome independently violates the Eighth Amendment because the
court incorrectly equated artificial competency with true competency.
The result is that, in capital punishment cases involving forcible medication, due process and Eighth Amendment concerns are only protected by staying an inmate's execution until the inmate regains the
required unmedicated competency.

